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This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. officials to a country, and 
the number of visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on foreign aid. To achieve 
our objective, we compile novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 
1960-2015 from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential 
endogeneity, we introduce novel instrumental variables for the official visits variables, 
namely aviation safety, capital distance, and urban distance. The 2SLS estimations provide 
evidence that the visits by the U.S. leaders to the country, and the visits of the country’s 
leaders to the United States, have a statistically significant negative effect on multilateral aid, 
but an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States. This indicates that 
other donors take the visits by U.S. Presidents as a signal that the country does not need aid 
either due to the costly reception of the American dignitary or because they assume that the 
country will be able to secure aid from the U.S. and will be less in need of their assistance. 
This also indicates that the costly official visits by the country’s leadership to the United 
States cause the donors to become reluctant to provide aid as these types of expenditure send 
a negative signal that the country is not administering its finances adequately to avoid the 
need for aid. 
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This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and 
Secretaries of State to a country on the level of foreign aid inflows. To be specific, we 
investigate whether the official visits by either U.S. Presidents or Secretaries of State allow 
the country to be able to attract foreign aid from the United States or from other donor 
countries. The paper also complements this analysis with an examination of the effect of the 
number of visits by the country’s leader to the United States on foreign aid. This is the first 
attempt in the literature to consider the number of official visits by the donor country’s 
leadership to the recipient country, and the number of official visits by the recipient country’s 
leadership to the donor country, as a determinant of foreign aid. 
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, “foreign aid is the international transfer of 
capital, goods, or services from a country or international organization for the benefit of the 
recipient country or its population.” Foreign aid can, thus, be perceived as the funds that one 
country voluntarily transfers to another in the form of a gift, a grant, a loan or concessional 
credit. The objective of foreign aid can be either to provide economic assistance, to combat 
poverty, to promote development efforts, to offer military support, or to furnish humanitarian 
relief.  
The intuition of this paper is straightforward. The visits of U.S. officials are usually 
taken as a chance to make a case for the country to secure U.S. capital, loans or aid. The visits 
of U.S. Presidents or Secretaries of state is a rare opportunity for the officials in the recipient 
country to show the visiting dignitary the economic conditions in their country on the ground, 
to stress the need for aid to deal with these conditions, and to exhibit how the people of their 
country who live in these conditions can benefit from aid flows. This effort is likely to be 
more effective to entice the visitor to recommend the donation of aid after what they saw in 
the ground with their own eyes, compared to hearing about these conditions or reading about 
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them in a report. Thus, we should expect that the visits by U.S. officials to have a positive 
effect on foreign aid. On the other hand, welcoming a U.S. President or a Secretary of state is 
costly. U.S. Presidents travel with a large entourage, and host countries need to make costly 
accommodations to ensure the comfort of the visiting official and their retinue. The expensive 
reception could send a wrong signal that the country does not need economic assistance. 
Thus, we should expect that the number of visits by U.S. officials to have an adverse effect on 
foreign aid. 
We also examine the effect of the number of visits by the country’s leaders to the 
United States of America. Leaders travel abroad to seek economic assistance by attracting 
foreign capital, bringing foreign aid or borrowing foreign loans. In the context of this paper, 
these foreign trips allow the leaders to present to the donor country the development projects 
that can be funded by official development assistance, to highlight the economic needs in 
their country that can be satisfied with foreign aid, to stress the future benefits of foreign aid 
for their efforts to develop their economy, and to reassure the donors of the ability of the 
country to repay the aid in case it takes the form of loans. Foreign donors can also take the 
visit of the head of the state as a strong signal from the highest levels of a country's leadership 
for their serious commitment to use foreign aid funds properly to finance development 
projects and to fight poverty in their country. Thus, we would expect that the number of 
leaders’ trips to be positively associated with foreign aid.  
On the other hand, the travel of the leader of the country to the United States is costly. 
A large entourage usually accompanies these leaders when they travel, and the need to cover 
the cost of traveling, lodging, security, transportation, and meetings of the leaders and their 
companions cause these trips to be a budgetary burden. Thus, the leaders’ trips can reallocate 
resources away from productive spending that would lessen the country’s need for foreign 
aid. These trips can also send a negative signal as it reflects how the leadership of the country 
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is administering its finances, and displays a lack of fiscal austerity in a country in need of 
foreign aid or official development assistance. In this case, donors would be reluctant to 
extend aid. Thus, we would expect the leaders’ trips to have an adverse effect on attracting 
foreign aid. 
Given that the effect of the visits of U.S. officials to the country, or alternatively the 
visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on foreign aid is inconclusive, an empirical 
analysis is warranted. To achieve its objective, the paper uses novel variables that indicate the 
number of visits by U.S. Presidents to the country, the number of visits by U.S. Secretaries of 
state to the country, and the number of visits by the leader of the country to the United States 
of America. These variables are derived from the archives of the U.S. Department of State.  
The paper examines the effect of these variables on official development assistance and 
on bilateral foreign aid flows from the United States. However, the key difficulty in 
determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much as the country can attract 
more foreign aid after the visits of U.S. officials, U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of state may 
be tempted to visit the recipients of aid flows as well. This is either to ensure the proper use of 
aid funds, to witness the economic effects of aid flows, to use aid as leverage for foreign 
policy objectives, or to demand payback in return for the donated foreign aid. According to 
the Congressional Research Service1 “Foreign assistance is the largest component of the 
international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy. On the basis of national security, commercial, and humanitarian rationales, U.S. 
assistance flows through many federal agencies and supports myriad objectives. These 
include promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving governance, expanding 
access to health care and education, promoting stability in conflict regions, countering 





terrorism, promoting human rights, strengthening allies, and curbing illicit drug production 
and trafficking.” 
When it comes to the effect of the country’s leader’s trips to the United States, we also 
deal with potential endogeneity. As much as the leader’s trips may attract foreign aid, it is 
also possible that leaders are tempted to visit countries that are considered major donors. In 
this case, the United States is one of the countries with a significant outflow of foreign aid. 
Thus, leaders would be tempted to visit the United States to request foreign aid. This indicates 
an issue of reverse causality.  
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use novel instrumental variables. For the 
number of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of state, we use aviation safety and capital 
distance as instruments. The first instrument captures the number of aircraft accidents in the 
country, as U.S. officials are more likely to visit countries with a higher level of aviation 
safety. The second instrument captures the distance between Washington D.C. and the 
location of the Presidential residence of a country, as U.S. officials are more likely to visit 
countries that are closer to their capital. For the number of leader’s trips to the United States, 
we use an instrument called urban distance which captures the gap between the level of urban 
development in the leader’s country and that of the United States.  
The Two Stage Least Squares estimations show that the number of visits of U.S. 
Presidents, and Secretaries of state, has a statistically significant negative effect on 
multilateral aid, but an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States. The 
Two Stage Least Squares estimation also shows that the leader’s trips to the United States has 
a statistically significant negative coefficient on multilateral aid, but insignificant effect on 




The analysis provides evidence that the sum of the official visits has an insignificant 
effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States, and a negative effect on multilateral aid 
that loses its significance after adding control variables. The results also show that the 
interaction term of the two official visits variables has an insignificant effect on bilateral aid 
flows from the United States, and a statistically positive effect on multilateral aid that loses its 
significance after adding the control variables. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature 
survey, section 3 includes the description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical 
estimation and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and figures 
are included thereafter. 
2. Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of foreign aid. Studies in this 
literature focus on either the effect of the features of the recipient country, or the 
characteristics of the donor country, on the amount of aid flows. 
The first set of studies focus on the features of the recipient. For instance, Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) investigate the objective of the allocation of aid in terms of satisfying the 
needs of the recipient countries or the interests of the donor countries. The authors provide 
evidence that aid was geared toward the recipient’s needs over the 1970s, while in the 1980s 
aid was directed toward satisfying the interests of donors. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) provide evidence that aid flows are determined by political 
and strategic considerations. The authors find that countries that are inefficient, mismanaged, 
non-democratic, and politically friendly to former colonizers, receive more foreign aid than 
other countries with a similar level of poverty. The authors also find that even though some 
donors give aid considering income levels and good institutions, others give aid to former 
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colonies tied by political alliances regardless of other factors. Alesina and Weder (2002) 
provide evidence that less corrupt governments do not receive more foreign aid or debt relief. 
The authors also find significant differences across donors, where Scandinavian countries 
reward less corrupt recipients while the United States favor democracies without paying 
attention to the quality of government of the recipient country.  
Bruck and Xu (2012) explore if aid accelerations are associated with policies and 
shocks in the recipient countries. The authors find that favorable regime changes and wars are 
significant predictors of aid accelerations, and that neighbors of war-torn countries are likely 
to get large aid inflows.  
Bermeo and Leblang (2015) examine the association between the immigrants from a 
recipient country residing in a donor country and aid flows. The authors provide evidence that 
donors use foreign aid to improve the living conditions in migrant-sending areas in order to 
decrease the demand for entry into the donor country, and that the migrants in the donor 
country also lobby for additional aid for their countries of origin.  
The second set of studies focus on the features of the donor countries. For instance, 
Chong and Gradstein (2008) examine the factors affecting voter support for aid provision in 
donor countries. Their analysis shows that satisfaction with own government performance is 
positively associated with willingness to provide foreign aid, and that aid is adversely affected 
by own government lack of efficiency. Kaufmann et al. (2019) that individual preferences for 
official development assistance in donor countries are negatively correlated with relative 
income within a country-year, and positively associated with inequality at the country level. 
The authors also show that official development assistance is significantly lower where 
policymakers are more susceptible to lobbying. 
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Heinrich and Kobayashi (2020) show that the public in donor countries have a strong 
aversion to providing aid to “nasty” governments that violate human rights, rig elections, and 
crack down on media, but also appreciates the benefits that aid achieves. Their analysis shows 
that this aversion can be reversed if the donor government engages more with the “nasty” one. 
Heinrich et al. (2016) argue that donor countries’ voters place a lower priority on aid during 
economic downturns and politicians react by cutting aid. Their analysis demonstrates that 
economic downturns lead to diminished public support for helping the poor abroad. Heinrich 
et al. (2018) argue that citizens in donor countries do not wholeheartedly support cutting aid 
to countries that abuse political rights when those states offer benefits. Their findings suggest 
that aid donors selectively punish repressive countries with aid cuts due to the preferences of 
the self-serving voters. 
Knack (2013) investigates the determinants of the donor’s decision to trust or bypass 
country systems. The analysis shows that the use of recipient country systems is positively 
associated with the donor's share of aid provided to the recipient, the extent of corruption in 
those systems, and public support for aid provision in donor countries. Acht et al. (2015) 
argue that donors resolve the issue of giving aid to countries who lack proper institutions by 
delivering aid through non-state actors. Their analysis shows that bypassing state institutions 
via non-governmental organizations and multilateral agencies comes as a reaction to weak 
recipient state institutions.  
Our paper’s contribution to the literature is that it is the first attempt to examine the 
effects of leaders’ visits on foreign aid. The second contribution is that this paper proposes a 
new way of looking at proximity between countries which have been identified in previous 
studies as a factor that determines financial flows between economies. This complements our 
work on the effect of leader’s visits on foreign investment in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa 
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(2020a), on foreign debt in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020b), on democracy in Kodila-
Tedika and Khalifa (2020c), and on conflict in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020c). 
3. Data 
The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica,  
Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, 
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, 
Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, 
Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti,  
Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, 
Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, 
New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, 
Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, 
Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, 
Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde,  Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.  
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The dependent variables in our analysis are two indicators of foreign aid. The first is net 
bilateral aid flows from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, United 
States, as a percentage of Gross National Income. This variable is denoted bilateral aid US 
hereinafter. The second indicator is net official development assistance ODA received as a 
percentage of Gross National Income. This variable is denoted multilateral aid hereinafter. 
The two variables are derived from the World Development Indicators.  
The variables of interest are the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
state to the country, and the number of visits by the country’s leaders to the United States of 
America during the period 1960-2015. This data is derived from the Office of the Historian, 
which is affiliated to the Department of Sate of the United States of America.2 Figures 1-3 
show world maps of the number of visits of U.S. Presidents to each country, the number of 
visits of U.S. Secretaries of state to each country, and the number of each country’s leader’s 
trips to the United States, respectively.  
We include some control variables that are identified by the literature as determinants of 
foreign aid. The first is an overall indicator of institutional quality measured as the sum of the 
six sub-indices from World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) for 1996: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Countries with higher values on this 
index have institutions of better quality. 
We include the level of development measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
PPP (constant 2011 international $) which is derived from the World Development Indicators. 
Countries with a lower level of GDP per capita is expected to be more in need of foreign aid. 
We also include the size of the country, as proxied by the area of the country in square 





kilometers and the country’s population. Finally, we include imports of goods and services as 
a percentage of GDP, derived from the World Development Indicators. Countries that rely on 
importing their needs will also be in need of foreign aid. 
4. Estimation  
4.1. Visits of U.S. Officials 
4.1.1. Baseline Results 
We conduct an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of official visits by the 
U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of state to the country on foreign aid flows during the period 
1960-2015. To explore this relationship we use the following equation 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 (1) 
Aidi is the amount of bilateral aid or multilateral aid attracted by country i. 
OfficialVisitsi is the number of visits by U.S. Presidents or Secretaries of state to country i. ℵi 
is a vector of control variables and μi is the error term.  
The vector of control variables includes those commonly identified in the literature as 
determinants of foreign aid. Thus, we control for the logarithm of GDP per capita as the 
country’s level of economic development is likely to determine its need for foreign aid. We 
also control for the country’s size using land area and its population. Larger countries are 
expected to be more in need for aid. We include institutional quality as countries with better 
institutions are more likely to be less in need for aid, or are better equipped to use aid funds 
properly. Finally, we include imports of goods and services as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product. Countries that rely on importing a large portion of their needs are expected 
to be also in need of foreign aid. The study is a cross-country analysis and applies the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation technique since our variable of interest is only 
available in cross-section. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the official visits variables 
and foreign aid. 
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The OLS results are shown in table 2. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is 
multilateral aid and the variable of interest is the number of visits of U.S. presidents. In 
columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is bilateral aid flows from the U.S. and the variable 
of interest is the number of visits of U.S. presidents. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent 
variable is multilateral aid and the variable of interest is the number of visits by the U.S. 
secretaries of state. In columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is bilateral aid flows from the 
U.S. and the variable of interest is the number of visits by the U.S. secretaries of state. 
The Ordinary Least Squares estimation, in column 1 of table 2, shows that the number 
of visits of U.S. Presidents has a statistically significant negative coefficient on multilateral 
aid. This is the case even after adding other control variables as shown in column 2. Column 3 
shows that the number of visits of U.S. Presidents does not have a statistically significant 
effect on bilateral aid flows from the U.S., even after controlling for other factors that 
determine aid as in column 4.  
The Ordinary Least Squares estimation, in column 5 of table 2, shows that the number 
of visits by the U.S. secretaries of states have a statistically significant negative coefficient on 
multilateral aid, but loses its significance once we include other control variables as shown in 
column 6. Column 7 shows that the number of visits by the U.S. secretaries of state does not 
have a statistically significant effect on bilateral aid flows from the U.S., even after 
controlling for other factors that determine aid as in column 8. 
These results imply that the number of  visits by U.S. officials have an adverse effect on 
the ability of the host country to attract foreign aid flows from other donor countries, but has 
no effect on bilateral aid flows from the U.S. This seems to indicate that other donors take the 
visits by U.S. Presidents as a signal that the country does not need aid either due to the 
expensive reception lavished upon the American visitors or because the donors assume that 
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the country will be able to secure aid from the U.S. and thus will be less in need of their 
assistance.  
In terms of bilateral aid flows from the U.S., the analysis shows that visits by U.S. 
officials do not have a significant effect. This indicates that either these visits are focused on 
discussing other issues than U.S. aid flows to the country, or that U.S. aid is determined by 
strategic factors that are not correlated with the economic conditions of the country that 
visitors observe during their official visits. 
The results also show that the size of the country, proxied by area or population, has an 
insignificant effect on aid flows. On the other hand, institutional quality has a statistically 
significant negative coefficient with multilateral aid, but insignificant coefficient with 
bilateral aid flows from the United States. This implies that countries with better institutions 
are probably the ones that are less in need of foreign aid from donor countries. Finally, 
imports of goods and services have a statistically significant positive effect on multilateral 
aid, but an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States. This implies that 
countries that are importers of a large portion of their needs are usually those in need of 
foreign aid as well.  
It is also worth noting that bilateral aid flows from the United States is not affected by 
any of the factors included in the analysis. This implies that aid from the United States flows 
for factors, other than the economic conditions of the country. This confirms the findings of 
some previous studies that show that aid flows from the United States to countries that are of 
significance to the strategic interests of the United States. This is not captured by any of the 
variables included in the analysis. 
4.1.2. Endogeneity 
The OLS estimation assumes that the official visits are exogenous to foreign aid. 
However, the problem of endogeneity cannot be ignored. First, the association may be 
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spurious due to the failure to account for an unobserved factor which could be affecting both 
aid flows and official visits. Second, as much as the country can attract more foreign aid 
during the official visits of American dignitaries, U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of state may 
be tempted to visit countries that receive foreign aid from the United States. This is either to 
ensure the proper use of aid funds, to witness the economic effects of aid flows, to check if 
the purpose of assisting the country is fulfilled, to use aid as leverage for other objectives, or 
to demand payback in return for their assistance. 
To deal with potential endogeneity, we need a source of exogenous variation in the 
number of official visits by using an instrumental variable approach. We compile two new 
instruments, namely aviation safety and capital distance. The first is aviation safety which is 
the number of aircraft accidents that occurred in the country from 1960 to 2015. We collected 
the raw data3 and aggregated the data for each country. We use another instrument called 
capital distance, which is the distance in km from Washington D.C. to the official place of 
presidential residence in every country around the world. We use the site 
https://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/latlong.html for the distance calculations. For reasons 
of robustness or reliability, we use others site to check the conformity of the calculated 
distance. These include: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/gccalc.shtml, and https://gps-
coordinates.org/distance-between-coordinates.php. 
This identification strategy is based on the intuition that U.S. Presidents and Secretaries 
of state are more likely to visit countries if the trip is sufficiently safe to undertake. A worse 
aviation safety record will dissuade U.S. officials from travelling to that country. This 
variable serves as a proper instrument because foreign aid is not likely to affect aviation 
safety. For the second instrument, U.S. officials are more likely to visit countries whose 
capital cities are closer to that of the United States, which is their place of residence. The 





proximity between capitals also decreases the cost of the trip. This variable serves as a proper 
instrument as foreign aid does not affect the distance between capital cities. 
In this context, the first stage of the Two Stage Least Squares estimation is described as 
follows 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑖 (2) 
Where Distancei is the distance between the presidential residence in country i and 
Washington D.C.,while Safetyi is the aviation safety record in country i.  
Table 3 shows the effect of official visits on foreign aid, corrected for endogeneity using 
the instrumental variables. Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 include the results of the second stage 
of the 2SLS using multilateral aid as our dependent variable, while columns 3 and 4 show the 
results of the second stage of the 2SLS using bilateral aid flows from the United States as our 
dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2, of table 3, show that the number of visits of U.S. 
Presidents and Secretaries of state has a statistically significant negative effect on multilateral 
aid. Columns 3 and 4, of table 3, show that neither of these variables have a significant effect 
on bilateral aid flows from the United States. This confirms our previous finding that the 
number of visits by U.S. officials sends a negative signal to other donor countries, but has no 
effect on aid flows from the United States. 
4.2. Leaders’ Trips to the U.S. 
We also explore the impact of the number of the country’s leader’s trips to the United 
States on foreign aid. In this case, we also deal with potential endogeneity. As much as the 
leader’s trips may attract foreign aid, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to visit 
countries that are considered major donors such as the United States. This indicates an issue 
of reverse causality.  
To deal with this issue, we need a source of exogenous variation in leader’s trips by 
using an instrumental variable approach. We use a novel instrument that we refer to as urban 
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distance, defined as the logarithm of the degree of urban development in a country divided by 
the logarithm of the degree of urban development in the United States. We measure the 
degree of urbanization by the urban land area in square kilometers.  
This identification strategy is based on the intuition that the gap between the urban 
development in the leader’s country and that in the United States justifies a leader’s trip to the 
U.S.A. The less urbanized the country the more the leader will be tempted to travel to the 
United States to enjoy the urban amenities and to take advantage of the ample financial and 
economic opportunities in the urban centers of one of the most developed countries. In 
addition, government aid agencies are usually located in urban areas such as capital cities of 
donor countries.  
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the leader’s trips and foreign aid. Table 4 
includes the results of the OLS estimation in columns 1 and 2 and the 2SLS estimation in 
columns 3 and 4, where the variable of interest is the number of leader’s trips to the United 
States. The 2SLS estimation shows that the leader’s trips to the United States has a 
statistically significant negative effect on multilateral aid, but an insignificant effect on 
bilateral aid flows from the United States. This also indicates that the costly official visits by 
the country’s leadership send a negative signal to the donors that the country is not 
administering its finances adequately to avoid the need for foreign aid. 
4.3. Interaction Terms 
Table 5 includes the results after adding two variables to our Two Stage Least Squares 
estimation. The first is the summation of the number of visits of U.S. Presidents and 
Secretaries of state. The second is the interaction term between the number of visits of U.S. 
Presidents and the number of visits of U.S. Secretaries of state. Columns 1-4 of table 5 show 
that the sum of the official visits has an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the 
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United States. On the other hand, the sum of the official visits has a negative effect on 
multilateral aid that loses its significance after adding control variables.  
Columns 5-8 of table 5 include the results after adding the interaction term, in addition 
to the two official visits variables used so far. The results show that the interaction term and 
the two official visits variables have an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the 
United States. However, the two official visits variables have a significant negative effect 
while the interaction term has a statistically positive effect on multilateral aid. These 
coefficients, however, lose their significance after adding the control variables. 
Finally, we add other interaction terms to our analysis. We include the interaction term 
between the leader’s trips and the visits of the U.S. Secretaries of state, the interaction term 
between the leader’s trips and the visits of the U.S. Presidents, and the interaction term 
between the three variables. The results are included in table 6. 
In columns 1-3, we have multilateral aid as our dependent variable. In column 1 we 
include the visits of U.S. Secretaries of state, the leader’s trips to the United States, and the 
interaction term between the two variables. In column 2 we include the visits of U.S. 
Presidents, the leader’s trips to the United States, and the interaction term between the two 
variables. In column 3 we include the three official visits variables and the interaction term 
between the three variables. 
The results show that neither the number of visits of U.S. Secretaries of state, nor the 
number of leaders’ trips to the United States, have a significant coefficient in all specification. 
On the other hand, column 2 shows that the number of visits of U.S. Presidents has a 
significant negative coefficient while the interaction term with the leader’s trips is 
significantly positive. This implies that the visits of U.S. Presidents send a negative signal to 
donor countries, unless it is complemented by a higher number of visits by the country’s 
leader to the United States. 
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In columns 4-6, we have bilateral aid flows from the United States as our dependent 
variable. In column 4 we include the visits of U.S. Secretaries of state, the leader’s trips to the 
United States, and the interaction term between the two variables. In column 5 we include the 
visits of U.S. Presidents, the leader’s trips to the United States, and the interaction term 
between the two variables. In column 6 we include the three official visits variables and the 
interaction term between the three variables. The results show that none of these variables has 
a significant effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect on foreign aid of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents 
to the country, the number of visits of U.S. Secretaries of State to the country, and the number 
of visits of the country’s leader to the U.S. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce 
novel instrumental variables for the three official visits variables, namely aviation safety, 
capital distance and urban distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by 
the U.S. leaders to the country, and the visits of the country’s leader to the United States, have 
a statistically significant negative effect on multilateral aid, but no effect on bilateral aid flows 
from the United States. This indicates that other donors take the visits by U.S. Presidents as a 
signal that the country does not need aid either due to the costly reception of American 
officials or because they assume that the country will be able to secure aid from the U.S. and 
thus will be less in need of their assistance. This also indicates that the costly official visits by 
the country’s leadership to the United States send a negative signal to the donors that the 
country is not administering its finances properly. 
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Figure 4. Official Visits of U.S. Presidents, and Secretaries of State, and Foreign Aid
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Multilateral Aid 158     7.189585   8.078572   .0082085   39.64924 
Bilateral Aid US 139     .8817021   2.424122   0   25.8567 
Capital Distance 191     8899.076   3743.188   0 16360 
Visits of U.S. President 195     3.112821   6.149142   0 38 
Visits of U.S. Secretary of State 157     16.36943   26.63266   0 153 
Aviation Safety 181     21.1989   40.49025   0 392 
Area 123     381.1329   1020.2   .122   8600.387 
GDP per capita  190     15482.4   18713.82   638.0007   117382.1 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 191     44.59668   24.64515   5.043709   162.475 
Population (log) 123     16.52971   63.1074   13.54   612.363 
Institutions 181    -.1398731   2.206965   -4.893744   4.592062 





Table 2. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Official Visits on Foreign Aid 
 
Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid US Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid US 
Visits of U.S. President -0.588*** -0.168* -0.017 -0.002 
    
 
(0.153) (0.092) (0.017) (0.013) 
    
Visits of U.S. Secretary of 
State     -0.055** 0.011 -0.000 -0.002 
     



































Imports of goods and 











































Cons 8.272*** 4.822*** 0.948*** 0.992*** 6.240*** 3.334*** 0.839*** 0.916*** 
 
(0.753) (1.154) (0.260) (0.290) (0.765) (1.182) (0.228) (0.294) 
Number of observations 158 85 139 81 123 73 114 73 
R2 0.069 0.358 0.003 0.043 0.026 0.323 1.043 0.045 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 




















Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid US 


















Area 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita  -0.000 -0.000*** 5.646 4.072 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 9.426 
Imports of goods and services (% of 
GDP) 0.022 0.017 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.096) (0.030) (0.009) (0.007) 
Population 0.012 -0.003 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutions 0.388 0.129 -0.110 -0.094 
 
(0.940) (0.403) (0.077) (0.079) 
_cons 9.559* 8.463*** 0.880** 1.009*** 
 
(5.645) (1.910) (0.355) (0.326) 
Number of observations 71 82 70 77 
R2 -3.644 0.046 0.056 0.051 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.0192 0.0000  0.4402 0.7385 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 4.346  6.030 6.218  9.801 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 0.340 10.283 3.980   17.028 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 




















Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid US Multilateral Aid 
Bilateral 
Aid US 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.024 -0.004 -0.248** 0.016 
 
(0.034) (0.004) (0.114) (0.022) 
Area  -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.000** -4.890' -0.000** -2.509 
 
(0.000) 9.588 (0.000) 8.072 
Imports of goods and services 
(% of GDP) 0.073** -0.003 0.051 0.004 
 
(0.028) (0.007) (0.062) (0.007) 
Population -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Institutions -0.830** -0.093 -0.269 -0.187 
 
(0.347) (0.075) (0.463) (0.151) 
Cons 4.292*** 1.059*** 8.196** 0.452 
 
(1.452) (0.331) (3.748) (0.583) 
Number of observations 82 77 67 65 
R2 0.348 0.055 -0.226 -0.028 
 
  
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  
Leaders' Trips to USA 
Urban Distance 
  
 7.116***  10.601*** 
   
(2.188) (2.328) 























Bilateral Aid US Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid US Multilateral Aid 
Visits of U.S. Secretary of State + 
Visits of U.S. President -0.001 -0.001 -0.054** 0.007     
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.011) 
    
Visits of U.S. Secretary of State * 
Visits of U.S. President     -0.001* -0.000* 0.015*** 0.004 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) 
Visits of U.S. Secretary of State 
    
0.013 0.000 -0.110** 0.000 
     
(0.016) (0.004) (0.050) (0.046) 
Visits of U.S. President 
    
-0.006 0.041 -0.776*** -0.317 
     



































Imports of goods and services (% 











































Cons 0.854*** 0.913*** 6.358*** 3.361*** 0.766*** 0.731** 7.574*** 4.436** 
 
(0.248) (0.299) (0.781) (1.208) (0.252) (0.343) (1.032) (1.708) 
Number of observations 114 73 123 73 114 73 123 73 
R2 0.000 0.044 0.033 0.322 0.009 0.062 0.082 0.345 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 






Table 6. All Variables 
 
Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid US 
 
I II III IV V VI 











Leaders' trips to USA -0.111 -0.082 -0.072 0.009 -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.073) (0.050) (0.064) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 









Visits of the Secretary of 






Visits of U.S. President 






Visits of U.S. President * Visits 
of U.S. Secretary of State 








Area -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 2.808 -6.428 3.647 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 9.772 (0.000) 
Imports of goods and services 
(% of GDP) 0.044 0.049* 0.045 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.034) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Population -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutions  -0.647* -0.545 -0.590* -0.126 -0.098 -0.127 
 
(0.333) (0.379) (0.336) (0.079) (0.077) (0.079) 
Cons 5.366** 6.724*** 5.088** 0.743* 1.019** 0.828** 
 
(2.340) (1.858) (2.191) (0.440) (0.394) (0.406) 
Number of observations 71 82 71 70 77 70 
R2 0.359 0.398 0.356 0.074 0.056 0.072 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
